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I
t has been more than two years since the ﬁnancial crisis ﬁrst broke out in
East Asia in the summer of 1997. Now that much of the dust has settled,
it is clear that the world economy was far from being mired in a global
slump.1 Furthermore, although the growth in the crisis-afﬂicted countries and
other emerging market economies did slow quite signiﬁcantly, growth was
sustained in North America and Western Europe. Indeed, growth accelerated
in some cases.2
Until very recently, the conventional view was rather pessimistic. Observers
feared that the economic stress that had begun in Southeast Asia would worsen
and spread. For the world economy as a whole, as well as for key industrial
countries, growth was expected to be slower, risks higher, and ﬂows of capital
further dislocated. Even in the United States, a country that, for most of its
history, has shrugged off economic turmoil abroad, there was a fair amount
of nervousness. Many economists forecasted much slower growth rates for the
next few years (see among others, DRI forecasts) in light of the intensity of
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Figure 1 Selected Asian Economies: Real GDP Growth
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
Figure 2 Selected Industrial Economies: Real GDP Growth
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics   
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the Asian crisis and the distinct possibility that it could spread worldwide.
The puzzling question that naturally arises is, “Why didn’t the whole world
economy enter a slump?”
In this article, we attempt to answer this question from a general equi-
librium perspective. The strategy here is to use a standard growth model
augmented with multi-region and multi-production sectors to analyze how a
set of real shocks hitting crisis countries affects the world economy as well
as economies in different regions. These shocks, as will become clear later,
are identiﬁed by recent research on the causes of the crisis. The mechanism
that connects regions and that transmits shocks across them consists of two
links: commodity trade and capital ﬂows. Our analysis shows that much of
the fear of a global recession spreading to industrial economies was not well
grounded. Moreover, the burden of adjustment to the crisis was uneven across
regions. The developing countries bore the brunt of this adjustment, suffering
declines in economic activities. By contrast, industrial countries escaped largely
unscathed. The impact the crisis had on them was small and even positive in
its initial stages.
This article does not attempt to explain the crisis and its causes. Rather it
measures, with the aid of a general equilibrium model of real trade and capital
ﬂows, the spillover effects of the crisis on the other regions of the world.
Surprisingly, while various explanations of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis have
been advanced, little effort has been devoted to analyzing its effects on the
world economy. More is the pity, for the importance of such an analysis is
great and indeed goes beyond what we conduct in this article. The results here
suggest that policy actions that have generally been viewed as responsible for
the robust growth of industrialized nations in the face of the ﬁnancial crisis may
not matter much after all. These actions include monetary policies adopted by
industrial countries. They also include the stabilization and reform package that
Asian crisis countries implemented at the insistence of the IMF. In other words,
it could well be that many common concerns were overstated and not based
on careful economic analysis.
1. WHAT HAPPENED?
While there is little consensus on the deﬁnite causes of the crisis, there is
now evidence that the region’s economies had been confronting a deteriorating
macroeconomic environment since the early 1990s (see, e.g., Krugman [1998],
Radelet and Sachs [1998], Flood and Marion [1998], Corsetti et al. [1998],
Chang [1999], and Whitt [1999]. A description shared by many is that given
by Chang [1999]).
Several countries in the region experienced a real appreciation in their
currencies during the 1990s and by 1997 had sustained sizable current account   
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deﬁcits. These deﬁcits were mostly ﬁnanced through short-term foreign bor-
rowing. Foreign portfolio and direct investment, attracted by the region’s record
economic growth for more than two decades, had also occurred. The growth
rate of exports and industrial output in crisis countries, on the other hand,
slowed substantially during the same period. This trend was largely the result
of the weak Japanese import demand combined with disinﬂationary aggregate
demand policies in most Asian economies.
The rapid inﬂow of capital and the slowing of growth unveiled a host of
inherent structural problems in the region’s ﬁnancial systems. These problems
included (1) lack of competition, supervision, and regulation of the ﬁnancial
sector, and (2) heavy government intervention in credit allocation. Under these
conditions, ﬁnancial intermediaries whose liabilities were guaranteed by the
respective governments naturally posed a serious problem of moral hazard in
which government guarantees subsidized and induced increased risk-taking,
and resulted in excessive borrowing and lending, mostly from abroad.
The essence of the crisis was a huge, sudden reversal of capital ﬂows that
was a manifestation of private investors attempting to liquidate their claims
brought on by a lack of conﬁdence in the countries’ ﬁnancial systems. Ac-
customed to large-scale capital inﬂows, the sudden turnaround in ﬂows was
an enormous shock to the Asian economies. Moreover, with a dramatic depre-
ciation in the real value of their currencies and high domestic interest rates,
domestic credit conditions tightened, which led to a rapid rise in non-performing
loans and a sudden loss of bank capital. The resulting collapse of domestic bank
capital added to the contraction by further restricting bank lending. The result
was the abandonment of planned investments by some ﬁrms and the curtailing
of production activities by others. Accompanying the decline in current income
and diminished expectations of future income, the consumption demand fell.
All of the crisis countries experienced a collapse in GDP growth in 1998.
2. ECONOMICS OF ADJUSTMENT TO CRISIS
The crisis affected the rest of the world, not only through the international ﬁnan-
cial system, but also through international commodity trade and capital mobility.
Since one region’s imports are another’s exports, the decline in imports of crisis
countries, agriculture for example, can cause agricultural exporting countries
to experience a decrease in their exports, and hence a fall in farm receipts.
The higher the ratio of agricultural exports to total production, the larger the
negative effects are likely to be.
A decline in the prices of internationally traded inputs tends to lower pro-
duction cost, thus affecting the competitiveness of various sectors depending
on the intensity of the use of these inputs in production. Offsetting the decline
in intermediate input cost is the cost of purely domestic resources, such as      
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labor, that are not traded internationally. The cost of these resources may rise
due to the expansion of production at home.
Another effect of the crisis is through capital markets. Capital leaving
crisis countries will ﬂow into non-crisis countries, putting downward pressure
on interest rates there. The reduced domestic interest rates will in turn stimulate
investment and thus growth in the domestic capital stock. Sectors that experi-
enced increased capital formation, either directly or indirectly from these ﬂows,
will respond by increasing their demand for other resources whose productivity
is increased by growth in capital stock. Thus, the growth in capital stock can,
by increasing the demand for labor and associated inputs, also contribute to the
bidding up of the prices of purely domestic or non-traded resources and further
raise the cost of production.
Effects of the Asian crisis on the world economy depend, in the long run,
on three factors: the extent to which pre-crisis expectations of long-run returns
to capital were grossly in error; the likelihood that the crisis will spread to
other regions; and post-crisis policies of crisis-ridden economies.
3. MODEL ECONOMY
We formalize the argument presented above, and estimate the spillover ef-
fects of the crisis on other regions of the world economy in this section. Our
model, employed in the following paragraphs, belongs to the family of multi-
sector, multiregion, computable general equilibrium setups. These frameworks
are used widely to analyze the impact of global trade liberalization and struc-
tural adjustment programs. Our model, which draws in many ways upon recent
contributions by McKibbin (1993), Mercenier and Sampaio de Souza (1994),
Mercenier and Yeldan (1997), and Diao and Somwaru (2000), incorporates con-
siderable detail on sectoral output, consumption, and trade ﬂows—both bilateral
and global.3 The model excludes ﬁnancial market phenomena that capture ef-
fects such as investor conﬁdence. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated later,
the model and the assumed shocks that disturb it account for most of the falls
in investment, output, and terms of trade observed in the Asian countries. One
does not need to revert to less well-deﬁned concepts as “ﬁnancial contagion,”
“ﬁnancial fragility,” and so on to explain the real effects of the Asian crisis.
Our scheme is to model the inherent structural problem of crisis economies
as overinvestment in certain sectors. The outbreak of the crisis and its sub-
sequent development are modeled as an impulse and response mechanism.
The impulse takes the form of an adverse shock to sectoral total factor
3 Noland, Robinson, and Wang (1999) uses a similar but static computable general equilib-
rium framework to analyze the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on the world economy under
the assumption that Japan and/or China depreciate their currencies.      
40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
productivity and to the risk premium associated with investment in these sec-
tors. For example, a negative shock means that productivity falls and the risk
premium rises. Such an increase in risk premium can be due to either policy
changes that eliminate governmental beneﬁts to ﬁrms or impair the collateral
ﬁrms could offer to potential investors.
The Asian ﬁnancial crisis has also had serious negative effects on aggregate
employment of resources. Many ﬁrms throughout the region went bankrupt,
and the rate of labor unemployment rose. Instead of specifying increased un-
employment or closed factories, however, we allowed all resources to remain
employed but reduced their efﬁciency, thereby generating the same fall in out-
put. The magnitude of these shocks is described in more detail below as we
analyze different scenarios.
To begin then, the closed world economy is divided into three open-trading
regions: developing economies, developed economies, and crisis economies. We
will specify countries in each region in the next section. There are four pro-
duction sectors in each region, and they each produce a single aggregate com-
modity. These sectors include (1) agriculture and food processes (agriculture);
(2) mineral, materials, and intermediates (intermediaries); (3) manufacturing;
and (4) services.
Within each region, a representative consumer makes joint decisions on
consumption and savings. Similarly, on the supply side, a representative pro-
ducer in each sector makes production and investment decisions simultaneously.
The model also incorporates multilateral trade and capital ﬂows among the
regions. Commodities produced for domestic markets are assumed imperfect
substitutes for those imported from abroad. The price of a good imported by
a region, therefore, is not necessarily the same as the price of the same good
produced at home or exported to other regions. A detailed description of the
model is as follows.
Firms
Producers within each sector of a region are aggregated into a representa-
tive ﬁrm. A ﬁrm makes production and investment decisions to maximize its
intertemporal proﬁts. In doing so, the ﬁrm chooses levels of labor and inter-
mediate inputs every period, taking as given prices of outputs, the wage rate,
prices of intermediate inputs, and the stock of capital. Outputs are either sold
in the domestic market or exported to foreign markets.
Firms are owned by a representative household or consumer, and invest-
ment is ﬁnanced by the household’s domestic saving and international bor-
rowing. At each period, ﬁrms’ proﬁts, divn,i,t—equivalent to the gross revenue
minus labor costs, intermediate input costs, and investment costs—are distrib-
uted to the household. Investment raises the stock of capital but there exist
capital adjustment costs. Investment goods are purchased from other sectors,          
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as well as from ﬁrms’ outputs. Investment goods can also be imported from








Xn,i,t = f(Ln,i,t,Kn,i,t,ITDn,j1,i,t,...,ITDn,jJ,i,t), (3.2)
Kn,i,t+1 = (1 − δn,i)Kn,i,t + In,i,t, (3.3)










discount factor for future returns; Xn,i,t is the ﬁnal output; Pn,i,t is the price of the
output; Ln,i,t,Kn,i,t, and ITDn,j,i,t are, respectively, labor, capital, and intermediate
inputs in the production of Xn,i,t; wn,t is the wage rate; PCn,j,t is the price of the
intermediate input used by ﬁrm i in the production of Xn,i,t; In,i,t is the quantity
of new capital equipment built through investments at time t; PIn,i,t is the price




adjustment cost per unit of capital investment.
Due to the presence of adjustment cost on capital, marginal products of
capital differ across sectors resulting in unequal, though optimal, rates of in-
vestments. Furthermore, once investment becomes realized as ﬁxed physical
capital, it cannot be reinvested in other sectors, especially in other assets such
as foreign bonds. There also exists other regional risk factors associated with
investment. We model such risk by adding a risk premium on the interest rate
faced by ﬁrms. That is, in each region, ﬁrms face an interest rate deﬁned as
rn,t = (1 + πn,t)rt, (3.4)
where πn,t is the risk premium for ﬁrms and is deﬁned as an exogenous vari-
able in the model, and rt is the riskless interest rate facing the world. For our
purposes, we assume the riskless interest rate prevails in developed economies.
A Cobb-Douglas production function relates the output of new capital
equipments with the inputs in the form of sectoral goods. These inputs can
be either produced domestically or imported. Hence, PIn,i,t can be written as a




where An,i is the efﬁcient coefﬁcient for investment, PCn,j,t is the price of the
composite good, 0 < dn,i,j < 1 and

j dn,i,j = 1.           
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Households
In each region a representative household owns labor and ﬁnancial assets, in-
cluding the equity in domestic ﬁrms and foreign bonds. The household allocates









subject to the following budget constraint:
SAVn,t = wn,tLn,t + TIn,t + divn,t + rtBn,t−1 − PTCn,tTCn,t, (3.7)
where ρ is the positive rate of time preference, TCn,t is the aggregate consump-
tion at time t, SAVn,t is the household saving, Bn,t−1 is the stock of foreign
assets, rtBn,t−1 is the interest earned from ownership of foreign bonds, PTCn,t
is the consumer price index, and TIn,t is the lump-sum transfer of government
revenues from taxes and tariffs. We assume no government saving-investment
behavior. The government spends all its tax revenues either on consumption or
as transfers to the household. TCn,t, the instantaneous consumption, is generated





ΣiPCn,i,tcn,i,t = PTCn,tTCn,t, (3.9)
where cn,i,t is the ﬁnal consumption for good i and consumption shares bn,i
satisfy 0 < bn,i < 1, and Σibn,i = 1.
World Commodity Markets and Capital Flows
International trade ﬂows are tracked by their origin and destination. The vari-
able Mn,s,i,t represents the trade ﬂow of commodity i from region n to s at time
t and is endogenous in the model.
When a country’s current consumption plus its investments exceeds its cur-
rent domestic income, the country experiences a trade deﬁcit in which imports
exceed exports. If the reverse is true, the country experiences a trade surplus, or
an excess in exports over imports. If the country does not own enough foreign
assets to offset a deﬁcit, the trade deﬁcit has to be ﬁnanced by international bor-
rowing (i.e., SAVn,t is negative). Once international borrowing occurs, foreign
capital ﬂows into the country. The current period’s foreign borrowing becomes
a net debt burden that either increases the country’s total outstanding debt or






(PWn,s,i,tMn,s,i,t − PWs,n,i,tMs,n,i,t), (3.10)          
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Bn,t+1 = (1 + rt)Bn,t + FBn,t, (3.11)
where FBn,t is the foreign trade deﬁcit of region n, PWn,s,i,t is the world price
of commodity i from region n to s at time t, and Bn,t is the foreign debt. A
negative FBn,t implies trade surplus for region n, while a negative Bn,t is foreign
assets for n.
We deﬁne a region’s real exchange rate as a ratio of the region’s consumer
price index over the same index for the region of developed economies, i.e.,
the consumer price index for developed economies is chosen as a numeraire.4
Movements in a region’s real exchange rate reﬂect changes in the price level
relative to that of developed economies. These movements do not capture any
changes in the region’s exchange rate policy or policies for ﬁnancial or mone-
tary sectors.
Government Policies
Government policy instruments include import tariffs, indirect taxes imposed
on production processes, and sales taxes on ﬁnal consumption.5 Our main pur-
pose here is to suggest how the effects of government interventions and weak
ﬁnancial systems might lead to overinvestment in ﬁnancially dubious projects
within crisis-ridden economies. Information necessary to address these matters,
however, is not available in a quantiﬁable form in the original database. For,
as discussed earlier, such government intervention has often taken the form of
implicit insurance that is equivalent to a stock of contingent public liabilities
reﬂected neither by data on debt nor on the deﬁcit until contingent liabilities
become actual ones, that is, until the crisis occurred. Even though there were
differences in the speciﬁcs of the governments’ policies to enable ﬁrms to
expand their investment, they all led to the same outcome: excessive concen-
tration of investments in certain key sectors of the economy. For these reasons,
we introduce an “investment subsidy policy” to capture the basic features of
government interventions in ﬁrms’ investment strategies. The subsidy, granted
only for manufacturing ﬁrms with no comparable provisions for the other three
sectors,6 is designed to lower ﬁrms’ capital installation (adjustment) costs as
4 This price index is the average of consumption good prices weighted by their base year
levels of consumption.
5 Further information about these instruments along with their initial levels are included
in the database used for conducting the calibration. See Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
Database, version 3, in McDougall (1997).
6 In Korea, excess investments and associated proﬁtability problems were concentrated in
the manufacturing sector, whereas in other countries, such as Thailand, the focus was on the
real estate sector (Huh 1997). Data availability limits our analysis to the case of subsidy to the
manufacturing sector. Since the manufacturing sector is more export-oriented, this arrangement
allows for a higher probabilty that the crisis will be propagated to the rest of the world. Therefore,
our analysis can be viewed as a worst-case scenario from the viewpoint of non-crisis economies.           
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well as to put a ceiling on the interest rate they face. We assume that the in-
vestment subsidy is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax on (or a lowered government
transfer to) the household.
More formally, let sn,i,t be the subsidy rate on the capital installation
cost, and γn,i,t be the difference in percentage between the market interest
rate and government’s interest ceiling. Then the capital adjustment cost func-





and equation (3.4) becomes
rn,i,t = (1 + πn,t)(1 − γn,i,t)rt, (3.12)
where sn,i,t and γn,i,t are positive for manufacturing and zero for the other three
sectors in crisis economies.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that at each time period three conditions hold. First, in
each region, the demand for production factors equal their supply. Second,
the world total demand for each sectoral good equals its total supply. Third,
aggregate household savings equal zero. In the steady state equilibrium, the







FBss + rssBss = 0.
Readers can ﬁnd more details of the model, including Euler equations used
to solve the model and a glossary of variables, in the appendix of our working
paper, “Challenges and Choices in Post-Crisis East-Asia: Simulations of In-
vestment Policy Reform in an Intertemporal, Global Model” (Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond Working Paper 98-7).
4. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In their recent paper, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) undertake an ex-
tensive analysis of the macroeconomic environment and ﬁnancial system of
crisis-ridden economies. Shunning a purely ﬁnancial panic explanation, they
conclude that common domestic and international shocks hit several East Asian
economies in the 1996–1997 period. Our simulation pursues this line of argu-
ment. Because we lack a full-ﬂedged theory on ﬁnancial-real economy linkages,
however, we directly implement the real, or nonmonetary, consequences of the     
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crisis on investment patterns. We do so by shocking the model (that is, by in-
creasing the risk premium and the difﬁculty of undertaking capital investment in
the region) to simulate the investment contraction. The actual crisis produces
currency depreciation as well as increases in domestic interest rates, prices,
unemployment, and bankruptcy rates in the affected countries. Such outcomes
are likely to cause investment to fall and economic growth to slow. Since
the intertemporal general equilibrium is a real or nonmonetary phenomenon in
which variables expressed as nominal or monetary magnitudes, including cur-
rency exchange rates and many ﬁnancial assets, are not explicitly recognized, it
cannot capture directly the effects of currency depreciation on world ﬁnancial
and asset markets.7
Our list of crisis economies includes a number of Asian countries (In-
donesia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan), two Latin American countries (Brazil and Argentina), and one
European country (Russia) to better capture the later development of the crisis.
The developed region includes EU countries, the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and Japan. The remaining countries are in the group of
developing nations.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the trade ﬂows for the three regions across the
agriculture, intermediaries, manufacturing, and services sectors. Crisis econo-
mies import chieﬂy from developed economies. Other developing economies
import from crisis and developed economies. Finally, developed economies
import agriculture, intermediary goods, and services from both crisis and other
developing economies, but import manufacturing goods mostly from the for-
mer. Crisis economies share with other developing economies a similar trade
structure in the sense that they export most of their commodities to developed
economies in all sectors except manufacturing. Developed economies export to
both crisis and other developing economies.
Our model employs investment subsidy to reduce the cost of capital adjust-
ment. It also uses a ceiling on interest rates to reduce the risk of investment in
the manufacturing sector. For our baseline solution, we choose the subsidy rate
that produces a total subsidy equal to 2.2 percent of total investment. Similarly,
we choose an interest rate ceiling that results in manufacturing ﬁrms facing a
rate 30 percent lower than the market rate of crisis economies. The subsidies
are received only by ﬁrms investing in the manufacturing sector and they are set
equivalent to 40 percent of the capital adjustment costs of this sector.8 The rest
7 However, the apparatus allows us to introduce the concept of real exchange rate as the
ratio of domestic versus foreign commodity baskets. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch. 4) for
an analytical exposure.
8 According to Dalla and Khatkhate (1995)’s calculation, the interest subsidy involved in
policy loans in Korea amounted to over 1 percent of GNP and 6.2 percent of government ex-
penditure in 1991; the cumulative subsidy during 1981–1991 amounted to 2 trillion won per
annum.        
46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Share of Imports by Region and Sector
Imp. Region Exp. Region Agriculture Intermediaries Manufacturing Services
Crisis Developing 0.08 0.055 0.01 0.03
Developed 0.92 0.945 0.99 0.97
Developing Crisis 0.292 0.41 0.174 0.194
Developed 0.708 0.59 0.826 0.806
Developed Crisis 0.784 0.852 0.976 0.85
Developing 0.216 0.148 0.024 0.15
Table 2 Share of Exports by Region and Sector
Exp. Region Imp. Region Agriculture Intermediaries Manufacturing Services
Crisis Developing 0.222 0.062 0.054 0.042
Developed 0.778 0.938 0.946 0.958
Developing Crisis 0.06 0.171 0.426 0.172
Developed 0.94 0.829 0.574 0.865
Developed Crisis 0.854 0.866 0.881 0.865
Developing 0.146 0.134 0.119 0.135
of the model is calibrated to the 1995 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
Database (see footnote 4) under the assumption that the initial current account
is in balance for each region. That is, each region’s initial current account is
assumed to be “sustainable” and consistent with its initial interest rate.
Baseline Scenario
In our baseline simulation, we proceed as follows. For the ﬁrst three years,
we exogenously raise the value of the region’s risk premium, πn,t, in Equation
(3.12) and reduce the technological coefﬁcient, An,i, in the sectoral investment
functions in equation (3.5) for crisis-ridden countries. Then, for the following
three years, we slowly lower the risk premium and raise An,i to its original
level. The shocks are chosen so that simulated changes in output in the crisis
economies match, during the ﬁrst seven years, that of the actual changes in
these regions in the years 1997, 1998, and 1999 and the IMF projection for
these countries for the years 2000–2003 (“World Economic Outlook and Inter-
national Capital Markets Interim Assessment,” International Monetary Fund,     
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December 1998).9 The comparison of simulated and actual results, as well as
the IMF projections, is in Figure 3. The simulation results for other variables
and for the other two regions are summarized in Figures 4–6.
Outcomes of the simulation closely track both the development of the
crisis and the IMF’s projections. GDP in crisis countries decreases with a fall
in investment. With the depreciation of the crisis area’s real exchange rate, the
price of traded goods increases relative to the price of goods domestically pro-
duced and consumed. Exports increase, imports decrease, and the trade balance
improves. A trade surplus together with a low level of investment produces a
current account surplus for these crisis economies.
The model also depicts the simulated effects of the crisis on the world
economy as well as on the other countries. As can be seen in Figure 4, world
GDP falls by 0.47 percent in the ﬁrst year of the simulation. GDP falls 0.23
percent in developing economies but rises slightly (0.02 percent) in the devel-
oped region in the ﬁrst year. Growth further slowed for all three regions in the
second year and started to recover beginning in the third year. These effects
are mainly the results of corresponding changes in the levels of international
commodity trade and capital mobility.10
The counterpart of the decline in commodity imports of crisis economies
is a corresponding fall in the exports of non-crisis regions. In the simula-
tion, exports fall by 5–8 percent in developed economies and 1–2 percent
in developing economies during the ﬁrst two years after the crisis. Since
exports as a percentage of total output are smaller in developed economies
(11.7 percent) than in developing economies (19.2 percent), it follows that
the same degree of export decline has a relatively smaller impact on GDP of
developed economies. Moreover, the export decline in developed economies
stems from decreased demand, especially for manufacturing and services of
crisis economies and other developing economies. Conversely, the export fall
experienced by developing economies stems mainly from competitive pres-
sure exerted by crisis economies who have a trade structure similar to their
developing country counterparts. Although the simulation produced a depre-
ciation in the real exchange rate in developing economies, it was relatively
9 The growth rate for the crisis-ridden region is a weighted (by GDP) average of the growth
rates of each country in the region minus their average growth rate from 1990–1996. These
numbers correspond to the percentage changes in GDP from the steady state reported from the
model.
10 According to IMF (“World Economic Outlook,” 1999), the change of growth rates in
world output (detrended by a 3.4 percentage average growth rate for world output from 1990 to
1999) are 0.78, −0.914, and −0.114 percent for 1997, 1998, and 1999 respectively. The weighted
(by their GDP) change of GDP growth rates for Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
and the United States (detrended by their respective average growth rates from 1990 to 1999) are
0.16, 0.051, and −0.21 percent for 1997, 1998, and 1999 respectively. Although our simulation
does not match the exact numbers, it does reproduce the qualitative patterns.   
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Figure 3 GDP Changes in Crisis Hit Economy
+
insigniﬁcant compared with the depreciation in crisis economies. Since ex-
change rate depreciation tends to spur exports by making them less expensive,
we ﬁnd that exports in developing economies decrease, but at a slower rate than
in developed economies. Conversely, imports for both developed economies and
other developing economies increased, with the rate of increase being higher
for developed economies. These numbers from our simulation are broadly con-
sistent with the actual ones. Among the ﬁve developed economies discussed
earlier (Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States),
all of them experienced substantial increase in their imports (year by year) be-
tween 1997 and 1999. Only the United Kingdom and the United States had
large drops in their exports. The other countries experienced an increase in their
exports; however, the increase in their exports was outpaced by a correspond-
ing increase in their imports. For the ﬁve crisis economies (Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia), all except Malaysia experienced a
substantial decline in imports in 1997 and 1998. And, except for Korea and
Indonesia in 1998, all experienced a large increase in their exports.
The decrease in exports and increase in imports in developed economies
produced a trade balance deﬁcit that was ﬁnanced by large capital inﬂow into
these economies. This inﬂow, when transformed into an increase in capital
stock, raises the production potential, hence GDP, of developed economies.
The developing economies, however, do not beneﬁt from such capital inﬂows   
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Figure 4a The Impact of the Crisis on World Economy
and investment falls initially and only rises slightly after that. With a negative
change, or appreciation, in its real exchange rate, its GDP falls slightly. Given
that developed economies account for about 70 percent of world GDP and   
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Figure 4b The Impact of the Crisis on World Economy
that the crisis does not affect them much, the world GDP only falls by 0.47
percent in the ﬁrst year of the simulation, even though the crisis economies
and developing economies register GDP falls of 3 and 0.23 percent.   
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Figure 5a Sectoral Effects of the Crisis: Crisis Hit Economy
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Figure 5 documents sectoral export and import changes for each region for
the ﬁrst six years following the crisis. We observe that, for crisis economies,
exports rise and imports fall during the ﬁrst two years in all four sectors. By the
third year, exports in all four sectors have reversed their signs and are showing
negative percentage changes. Imports in intermediate goods and manufacturing
have also reversed their signs and become positive, though it takes longer for
imports in agriculture and service to recover. For other developing countries,
exports decline in all four sectors in the ﬁrst two years, then recover starting
from the third year. Except for the ﬁrst year in manufacturing, imports have
increased. In developed economies, exports decline in all four sectors, more
so in manufacturing and service, in the ﬁrst two years. This decline in exports
is a result of the decreased import demand of crisis economies, a decreased
demand that more than offsets the increased import demand coming from other
developing economies.
Figure 6 depicts changes in bilateral trade ﬂows between crisis-ridden
economies and the other two economies. Following the crisis, the real ex-
change rate depreciation in crisis-ridden regions causes, by cheapening the   
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Figure 5b Sectoral Effects of the Crisis: Other Developing Economy
region’s exports while rendering its imports dearer, a fall in its imports and rise
in its exports. Since one region’s imports are another’s exports, the developed
region’s exports of manufactured goods and services suffer a fall both from the
reduced import demand of the crisis-ridden region and the competitive effect
of that region’s increased exports, which displace, or crowd out, the exports of
the developed region.
Alternative Scenarios
In our simulation of the baseline scenario, we attempted to replicate both (1) the
development or unfolding of the crisis and (2) the most recent IMF projections.
One may argue that these events and projections already take into account pol-
icy actions mentioned earlier. Therefore, it is not surprising that, by matching
growth rates of crisis countries to these numbers, we saw little or no impact on
the world economy and its constituent industrial economies. Put another way,
had it not been for the policy considerations, growth rates for crisis economies
would have been slower and thus the effects of the crisis on the world and
industrial economies larger. For example, concerns were manifest that the crisis       
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Figure 5c Sectoral Effects of the Crisis: Developed Economy
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would, by enhancing investment risk in two ways, divert investment away from
emerging markets. First was the risk that the crisis would, through contagion,
generate additional crises. Second was the risk that the crisis may, by raising
public fear, make potential investors more risk-averse than they were before.
Both types of risk would inhibit investment in emerging markets. Consequently,
we construct two alternative scenarios to account for possible implications of
this risk.
Scenario One
In scenario one, we disturb, or shock, the crisis-ridden region’s risk premium so
that GDP declines in the region are consistent with the IMF projection back in
October 1998 (“World Economic Outlook,” International Monetary Fund, Oc-
tober 1998).11 It takes about ten years for the GDP in the crisis-ridden region
to completely recover. We ﬁnd that the pattern of changes in investment, GDP,
11 The decline in GDP for the crisis hit region was projected to be −3.6, −6.4, and −4.3
respectively for the ﬁrst three years.  
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Figure 6a The Impact of the Crisis on the Bilateral Trade between
Crisis Hit Region and Other Regions  
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Figure 6b The Impact of the Crisis on the Bilateral Trade between
Crisis Hit Region and Other Regions      
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current account, exports, imports, and the real exchange rate are the same as
baseline simulation results, but the magnitude is bigger. The world GDP drops
0.64 percent the ﬁrst year, 1.32 percent the second year, and 0.31 percent the
third year. GDP in the other developing region declines for two consecutive
years (−0.30 and −0.29 percent), while GDP in the developed region increases
slightly in the ﬁrst year (0.01 percent), decreases for the next year, and begins
to recover in the third year (−0.002 and 0.035 percent, respectively). Capital
ﬂows going from the crisis-ridden region to the other developing region and
the developed region are more severe. In particular, countries in the developed
region show large capital account deﬁcits.
Scenario Two
In scenario two, we consider the policy reforms undertaken by crisis economies
during the period. In particular, we eliminate the government’s investment sub-
sidy and remove the ceiling interest rate in the manufacturing sector. Of course,
without an explicit banking sector, the model cannot capture all effects of a
change in the government’s investment policy, especially the effects of gov-
ernment intervention in the banking system. Note, however, that even though
the model lacks an explicit banking system, it maintains an effective ﬁnancial
capital market economy in a theoretically consistent framework.
It is obvious that the investment-subsidy policy distorts ﬁrms’ investment
decisions and thus leads to overinvestment in manufacturing and possibly
underinvestment in other sectors, such as services. It follows that removing
such policy distortions would lower manufacturing investment and increase
investment allocated in the other sectors. Eliminating the investment subsidy
to manufacturing also affects the trade structure of the crisis-prone region as
investors now require a higher premium to hold assets of manufacturing ﬁrms.
In the crisis-ridden region, GDP also worsens for the ﬁrst few years compared
with its counterpart in the baseline scenario.12 For countries in the developed
region, GDP again was not affected much—the growth rate was 0.01 percent
for the ﬁrst year, −0.08 percent for the second year, and 0.32 percent for the
third year—although its current account deﬁcits declined further. Moreover,
the simulated investment policy reform conducted by the crisis-ridden region
generates relatively modest aggregate effects in the short and medium run.
The main reason is that the expected gains from the investment policy reform
take the form of enhancement to economic efﬁciency, i.e., gains in productivity
growth. Our model cannot capture such endogenous gain, however, as it is based
on neoclassical growth theory in which productivity growth is exogenous. In
actual policy setting, one may encounter many other forms of distortions in
12 For the crisis hit economies, GDP declined 3.6, 6.8, and 3.3 percent for the ﬁrst three
years, and 2.5 percent for the ﬁfth year.     
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industrial policies, in banking systems, or in capital markets of crisis-ridden
economies. We would expect once countries implemented such essential re-
forms, adjustments in their economies as well as in the entire world would be
much larger than they are in our simulations.
In summary, our simulation analysis indicates that the crisis reduced
GDP in developing economies, but raised GDP in developed economies.
Furthermore, the crisis had a larger effect on developing than on developed
economies. Capital ﬂows from crisis economies to non-crisis economies, de-
veloping and developed, caused capital account deﬁcits in both regions, more
so in the developed region.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The preceding paragraphs have investigated the impact of the East Asian Cri-
sis on the world economy with the aid of an intertemporal general equilibrium
model. Admittedly our model is incomplete; it contains no monetary or ﬁnan-
cial sectors. Still, despite the absence of a full-ﬂedged model of real-ﬁnancial
linked theoretical apparatus, we were able to estimate the real effects of the
crisis by examining its consequences on investment demand. Our simulation
results, conducted under three reasonable scenarios, revealed that the crisis had
by far the largest negative impact on other developing economies. The impact
on industrial economies, on the other hand, is generally small and even positive
initially. Our analysis suggests that the fear of a “global slump” was not well
founded. The corollary is that policy actions associated with the “recovery” of
the world economy may not have mattered at all, since there was no global
slump from which to recover.
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